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OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

25 April 1951

REF : Memorandum to the Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
from Major General A. R. Bolling, A. C. of S., G-2, dated
25 April 1951 on above subject

1. Reference memo from Major General Bolling states that:

"It is recommended that the attached study, subject as above, be considered by the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a matter of urgency and that a National Intelligence Estimate be prepared. Prompt consideration should be given to this matter because the month of May is the most propitious time for the launching of a satellite attack."

2. The G-2 study forwarded with General Bolling's memo concludes as follows:

"The European Satellites now have the capability of initiating offensive operations against Yugoslavia at any time, with little or no warning.

"Evidence of stepped-up propaganda, increased border incidents, and further deterioration of relations with neighboring Satellites, together with recent significant augmentation of Satellite military capabilities, warrants serious consideration of the possibility of a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia this spring.

"There is no firm evidence that a Satellite attack against Yugoslavia is imminent. It is believed that such an attack is not probable this spring, but nevertheless remains a distinct possibility."

DOCUMENT NO. _____
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 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS (S) C
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
 AUTH: HR 70-2
 800010015481 REVIEWER: 006514

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A0008000100150015-8 REVIEWER: 006514

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3. In addition to the indications mentioned in Tab "A" of the G-2 study, there have been several other recent developments suggesting the possibility of an early Satellite attack on Yugoslavia. From a hurried review of these indications it appears that either an IAC consideration of the G-2 study, or an IAC review of NIE-29, would be desirable.

4. In NIE-29 we concluded that:

"Although it is impossible to determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, we believe that the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility."

The new evidence referred to does not appear to alter this conclusion. However, in the light of this new evidence it might be advisable to emphasize once more that a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 is a "serious possibility."



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